In a new series of blog posts, we introduce the countries we are comparing regarding the role EU-derived rights might have in them. Our overall aim is to develop a new socio-legal theory of European integration based on the practical usage of EU-derived rights in European society. We have selected eight smaller states (or parts thereof) for qualitative research, comparing Member States and neighbouring states from Northern, Western, Southern, and (South) Eastern Europe. For the fifth entry in this series, we introduce North Macedonia, a long-distance contender in the EU integration journey. In the Rights to Unite project, the country represents the Western Balkans group of candidate countries in the EU neighborhood, characterized by distinctive regional features and an idiosyncratic integration process.
North Macedonia is a small country with fewer than 2 million inhabitants, located on the Balkan Peninsula, and was formerly part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It is one of the most multiethnic countries in Europe, with the largest ethnic groups in the country being Macedonians (58.44%) and Albanians (24.30%), followed by Turks, Roma, Vlachs, and others. The country’s multiethnic character has long shaped its domestic and regional political dynamics.
The relationship between the region (then Yugoslavia) and the EU (then the EEC) dates back to 1959, shortly after the EEC’s establishment in 1957[i]. The 1970 trade agreement between the EEC and Yugoslavia “was the first agreement to be negotiated under the provisions of the Common Commercial Policy and, at the same time, the first to be concluded with a socialist country”[ii]. Tito’s diplomacy towards the EEC was dynamic and proactive; however, Yugoslavia’s position as a non-aligned country during the Cold War dynamics posed a major obstacle to deeper cooperation and potential EU integration.
Although Yugoslavia sought deeper economic, financial, and social cooperation, as well as political support from the EEC, these efforts achieved significant but low-profile and limited success[iii]. Nonetheless, opinions on the EEC/EU-Yugoslavia relationship are divided, ranging from very critical views of the EEC (particularly certain member states) to perspectives arguing that the relationship was successful given the circumstance.
North Macedonia successfully seceded from Yugoslavia peacefully through a referendum in 1991, where 96% of the population voted in favor of independence with 75% turnout. The result of this referendum stemmed from responsible political leadership and the fear of war that was already unfolding in Yugoslavia. The first Constitution was adopted in 1991, defining the country as an independent, democratic, and social state with a multiethnic character.
North Macedonia has the longest process for EU membership, excluding Turkey, as the process is officially frozen. Starting as a poster child of EU integration by signing the first-of-its-kind Stabilization and Association Agreement between the EU and a Western Balkan country in 2001 and being awarded candidate status in 2005, it was then expected that North Macedonia would join the EU alongside Croatia. That didn’t happen primarily because of the name dispute with Greece and other consequent processes that influenced one another.
Wars, ethnic cleansing, and a refugee crisis marked the 90s in the Balkans. Despite the peaceful secession, these wars significantly impacted the internal political landscape, particularly the conflict in Kosovo and the resulting refugee crisis.
The term “Western Balkans” is constructed by the EU in this period, designating the region of ex-Yugoslavia minus Slovenia, plus Albania, for the EU’s political agenda. After the signing of the Dayton Agreement, in 1996, the EU adopted a multilateral policy toward the “Western Balkans” known as “The Regional approach” (see Grizo, M., & Ananiev, J. (2014), p.5).
The limited success of the EU’s integration policies toward this region is, among other factors, due to the top-down one-size-fits-all approach, which is characterized by a lack of adoption to the specific political context. Due to the varying roles of the Western Balkan states in the wars of ex-Yugoslavia, a unified approach toward the region had limited success (see Grizo & Ananiev, p.12). For the cooperative North Macedonia, the adoption of the “Regional approach,” was considered a step backward in EU integration. But, in 1997 North Macedonia was the first country to sign a Cooperation Agreement with the EU.
The peaceful attitude of North Macedonia contributed to the neglect of rising tensions between the Albanian and Macedonian ethnic groups. The position of the Albanian ethnic group in the Balkan Peninsula, in ex-Yugoslavia, and subsequently in the separate states is complex and contested. The Albanian minority did not enjoy equal political recognition and rights, and tensions between the majority population of Macedonians and the minority of Albanians were always present and inadequately addressed. Although Macedonia was generally seen as more tolerant and accepting of different ethnicities compared to other countries, the rise of right-wing nationalism in the 90s exacerbated the tensions.
The establishment of religion as part of national and political identity in the 90s, and fixating the Macedonians as Orthodox Christians and Albanians as Muslims, contributed towards increasing interethnic hatred and distrust. The National Liberation Army (NLA), an ethnic Albanian political and military organization, perceived a window of opportunity after the war in Kosovo and began militarized operations in North Macedonia, resulting in the armed conflict of 2001. Another significant event in the same year is the signing of the Stabilization and Association Agreement with the European Union.
The conflict was brief but intense, taking place in the northwestern part, including areas of the capital, Skopje. The NLA’s goals included greater autonomy for the Albanian people in Macedonia within the state, as well as equal civil rights and political participation- achievements that could have been realized without bloodshed, atrocities, and the displacement of entire villages. The conflict led to the signing of the Ohrid Framework Agreement in the summer of 2001, which was later seen by the international community as a good example of multi-ethnic relations. Academia and civil society are critical of this view although the EU integration process played a crucial role in advancing the protection of minority rights in the country.
Unfortunately, there were additional issues that burdened the European future of North Macedonia. Immediately after the declaration of its independence, Greece expressed its contended position with the name “Macedonia,” claiming that the name presents a territorial claim to the Greek Northern province also called “Macedonia.” So, North Macedonia was recognized as an independent country and a member of the UN as “The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – FYRM.” The negotiations between the two governments within the UN framework began immediately and lasted for more than 25 years, with varying intensities. Greece imposed a border blockade and a trade embargo, which damaged the young and unstable Macedonian economy by blocking access to the region’s main port, Thessaloniki.
The first success of the negotiation came early in 1995 with the signing of the Interim Accord, which ended the embargo and stated that Greece wouldn’t object to North Macedonia’s application for membership in international organizations under the name “Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.” With the Interim Accord, North Macedonia agreed to change its flag and emblem. However, meaningful progress wasn’t made soon after the Interim Accord, and relations became confrontational. In 2008, Greece violated the Interim Accord by objecting to North Macedonia’s NATO application. In 2011, the ICJ issued a favorable decision for North Macedonia, ruling that Greece had breached the provisions of the Interim Accord.
Nationalistic sentiment and backward-looking attitudes were prevalent in both countries, with the main public discussion centered on who had the right to claim Alexander the Great’s heritage. The grandiose and expensive project “Skopje 2014” by the right-wing government of VMRO-DPMNE epitomized this aspect. The project involved constructing a colossal statue of Alexander the Great in Skopje, renaming public buildings and streets, and reinforcing the ancient Macedonian elements in the country’s cultural and national identity. The project had many adverse effects on the democratic, multi-ethnic, and civic character of the state, as well as a deterioration of relations with Greece, among other issues (see Shasivari, J., & Zejneli, I. (2013), p. 600-601).
The crisis caused by Greece’s blocking of NATO membership in 2008 was exploited by the government of VMRO DPMNE, led by PM Nikola Gruevski, to capture the state and establish an autocratic regime that lasted for a decade (see Auerbach, K. R., & Kartner, J. (2023), p. 548). This state-capturing process occurred concurrently with a similar process in Hungary, with the main difference being that North Macedonia’s autocratic regime changed in 2017. Nikola Gruevski’s political career ended with his escape from a prison sentence for corruption, made possible by the granting of political asylum by his friend Viktor Orban.
An even deeper politicization of institutions, media control, the arrest and attack of journalists, the capture of the judiciary, anti-gender campaigns, scapegoating of women, LGBTI individuals, ethnic and other minorities, election fraud, police violence, and attacks on academic autonomy and NGOs were part of the tools in Gruevski’s toolbox. This internal situation further alienated the country from the EU integration process, as state capture and democratic backsliding became as big problems as the name dispute. Nevertheless, since 2009, North Macedonia has consistently received positive evaluations from the European Commission, confirming its readiness to begin negotiations (see Mojsovska, S. (2021), p. 563).
The EU supported the protests and the opposition, criticizing the democratic backsliding, though it might be criticized for doing too little too late, particularly concerning the rule of law and human rights issues.
The autocratic government was overthrown after an internal crisis caused by a massive wiretapping scandal, the strengthening of the opposition parties, and the active civil movements (youth and students, women’s movement, LGBTI, journalists, NGOs, etc.) that joined together in the massive protests called “The colorful revolution.” Finally, in 2017, the social democratic pro-EU government came into power with big expectations on implementing the agenda of democracy, and pursuing EU integration.
Finally, in 2018, the left-wing government of Tsipras in Greece and the social democratic, pro-EU government of Zaev presented a perfect opportunity to resolve the name dispute. The Prespa agreement was signed in 2018, bringing an end to the long-standing conflict and strengthening regional peace and cooperation. In 2019, a referendum was held in which citizens were asked if they were “in favor of EU and NATO membership by accepting the Prespa agreement.” Joining NATO and the EU was the main argument for accepting the agreement (see Maatsch, A., & Kurpiel, A. (2021), p. 64).
The right-wing party VMRO DPMNE, now in opposition, blocked the referendum, urging its supporters not to cast their ballots. Although 91% of the voters were in favor, the turnout was very low at only 37%. However, the results of the referendum were non-binary for the parliament, and later in 2019, the Constitution was amended with the new name, supported by some MPs from VMRO DPMNE.
Most VMRO MPs who voted for the constitutional amendments made deals with the government for waiving charges related to corruption and for the storming of the Parliament in 2017. In Greece, the ratification of the agreement was also turbulent, and it was passed in 2019 with a narrow margin (see Maatsch, & Kurpiel, p. 64).
As Mojsovska notes, the perception that North Macedonia’s European future was assured played a central role in motivating the country’s decision to change its name—particularly as visits from EU leaders and their vocal support for the “yes” campaign during the name-change referendum reinforced the hope. However, the decision to open membership negotiations was again postponed because France requested that the European Commission prepare a new accession methodology. This came as a huge disappointment (Mojsovska 2021, p. 564.), considering that a pro-EU government desperately needs a win after taking the politically unpopular but courageous step of changing the country’s name. Finally, in 2020, the Council adopted the decision to start negotiations.
However, the next obstacle to EU membership was waiting around the corner. Bulgaria, the eastern neighbor, used its position to raise its issues with North Macedonia and to impose new conditions for EU membership. The relationship between the countries has always been ambiguous and complex due to their shared history, similar languages, and ethnic cultures. In very general terms, Bulgaria wants North Macedonia to accept its perspective on the Macedonian language, history, and culture, which is that it is Bulgarian. Bulgaria also wants North Macedonia to recognize the Bulgarian minority in its Constitution and to renounce its demands for recognition and protection of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. Even before the Bulgarian veto in 2016, Nancheva & Koneska concluded:
“the Europeanization dynamics, which have become hospitable to nationalist political agendas, now facilitates the occurrence of nationalist conflict in the European periphery instead of halting it and enabling reconciliation” (Nancheva, N., & Koneska, C. (2015), p. 225).
Once again, nationalism, confrontations concerning the past, and tribal politics are the main obstacles on the path to the country’s European future.
All these events led to the 2024 election results, in which the right-wing, EU-skeptic VMRO DPMNE party, with authoritarian tendencies, came to power again. Considering the current political circumstances, both domestically and regionally, significant steps towards EU membership is not anticipated anytime soon.
Having in mind Macedonia’s lengthy and complex history of EU integration, the country presents an excellent case for examining the flaws in the EU accession process. The never-ending conditionality, the constant evolution of requirements, and the lack of mechanisms to ensure that the basic principles of the rule of law and promotion of fundamental rights are dominating in the EU’s neighborhood policy.
Euroscepticism is growing among the population, but support for EU membership remains solid. According to the Institute for Democracy Societas Civilis’ 2024 public opinion analysis, 62% of the population supports EU membership, which represents a slight increase compared to last year. However, according to the same study, only 20% support another constitutional change.
Despite the hardship, North Macedonia has benefited from the EU accession process, not least in relation to EU-derived rights: from 2009, Macedonians have been able to travel visa-free in the Schengen area. The EU is one of the major economic partners and an accelerator of democratic reforms.
The EU’s portfolio in human rights was compromised in the handling of the refugee crisis in 2015, which had a significant impact on North Macedonia as a country of the so-called “Balkan route”. Also, the EU’s portfolio in Roma rights is conflicting due to its requests that led to national policies of preventing Romani people from crossing the border, because they might stay in the EU (see Kacarska, S. (2019)).
High levels of corruption are a common trait of Western Balkan countries. The transition from a state-controlled to a liberal economy in the 1990s was accompanied by the plundering of public goods and the takeover of workers’ managed companies by political elites. The EU’s role in pushing for market liberalization in the region too soon, without ensuring that the necessary conditions are met, is seen as fostering opportunities for corruption.
With a GDP of 59% below the EU average, North Macedonia is among the poorest countries in Europe. The GINI coefficient was 31.4 in 2020 (EU average of 29.6), representing a significant decrease over the last 7 years, which indicates that the country has moderate economic inequality.
Overall, there is a strong alignment of national legislation with EU standards, but implementation remains a challenge. The EU accession process is used as an opportunity to improve the protection of human rights for various groups. However, institutions often face criticism for their superficial and sometimes uncritical and selective acceptance of EU legislation, which occurs without fostering meaningful public debate.
Given the unique characteristics of North Macedonia’s EU integration process, examining the role of EU neighborhood law in the country is particularly relevant. The RIGHTS-TO-UNITE project focuses on the use of EU-derived rights and their significance in processes of societalization. It challenges the dominant discourse that prioritizes the integration of states and institutions, instead shifting attention toward the integration of societies through rights.
As a small, non-EU country, North Macedonia is rarely included in academic research at the EU level, despite strong scholarly interest in the “big” questions of EU integration and international politics—such as the name dispute, the Ohrid Framework Agreement and the Bulgarian veto—that tend to overshadow interest in experiences and the meaning of the EU in people’s lives.
[i] Zaccaria, B. (2016). The EEC’s Yugoslav policy in Cold War Europe, 1968–1980. Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 16-17.
[ii] Idem, p. 177.
[iii] Idem, pp. 180 – 184.