On the 26th of October 2024, Georgia held parliamentary elections, selecting 150 representatives for its legislative assembly – using a proportional electoral system for the first time. The elections saw multiple claims of foreign (Russian) interference. The declared victory of populist Georgian Dream (GD), for the 4th time, will likely impact Georgia’s accession to the EU. RTU sat down with Associate Professor of Sociology at Tbilisi State University and Executive Director of the Centre for Social Sciences in Tbilisi, Dr Lia Tsuladze, who is one of our collaborators, to understand the picture on the ground.
Background to Georgia and its EU integration process
To this day, EU-Georgia relations are part of the EU’s Neighbourhood Policy’s Eastern Partnership, with the EU-Georgia Association Agreement concluded in 2014 and first entering into force in 2016. Georgia is one of the three states using the framework of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), alongside Moldova and Ukraine. The DCFTA encourages the progressive alignment of Georgian legislation with the European acquis, both in relations to market access and democratic development.
EU integration was included in the Georgian Constitution in 2018, and Georgia applied for EU membership in 2022. The European institutions moved swiftly, and in December 2023, the EU Commission granted candidate status, albeit with a set of recommendations, many of them covering issues related to a free civil society, prevention of foreign interference, civil and political rights and judicial reforms among others.
However, these reforms have been slowed down by the rise of the GD party to power since 2012, after some internal conflicts now with Irakli Kobakhidze as Prime Minister. Under his leadership, multiple reforms have been forcefully adopted, often targeting civil society. Dr Tsuladze highlighted two for us: the “Transparency of Foreign Influence” law (making it mandatory for many members of the civil society to register as “foreign agents”) and a Russia-inspired “LGBT propaganda ban”.
To this day, the future of EU integration for Georgia is still laid out in the Revised Association Agenda for 2021-2027, but in practice, the accession process has been grinding to a halt – and the October 2024 elections are likely to confirm this standstill.
October 26th elections and the European future of Georgia
GD ran on a conservative platform, heralding national (sometimes religious) values, and relying on the Politics of Fear to discredit their political opponents, including but not only the pro-EU coalition “Unity – National Movement” (UNM). GD tended to label all opposition parties as being under the wing of UNM, which again was framed as constituting a “radical opposition”.
They strategically presented this opposition as controlled by a “global war party”, stoking fear about a potential revolution in Georgia. GD ended up claiming 88 of the 150 seats available, but for Dr Tsuladze, the electoral process was too fraught for this to be an accurate representation of the democratic will.
“Whatever fraud one can imagine, everything was put in practice”, she explained. “From confiscating IDs of oppositional-minded public employees, to bribing others, adding fake voters to the registration lists, violating the principle of anonymity (as everyone could see the marked circles from the back side), and using traditional carousels.”
As an illustration, “The GD voters even exceeded the number of residents from certain villages; for instance, although 2699 people live in Kazbegi, it turned out that 3470 people voted for GD and although 5152 people live in Tsageri, it turned out that 6852 people voted for GD there”.
cr: Jelger Groeneveld
The Helsinki Commission and the OSCE have also raised multiple concerns about the legislative reforms which lead to the elections, and the intense polarisation that was the backdrop of the campaign. The EU itself, through a Joint Statement by the High Representative Josep Borrell and the European Commission, expressed skepticism and asked for the Central Election Commission (CEC) of Georgia, to look into the potential irregularities.
This seems to have been heard, as the CEC announced the start of a recount process for almost 15% of the votes, and the Prosecutor’s Office opened an investigation of potential electoral fraud on October 30th. Whether this investigation will expose any irregularities committed by GD representatives remains to be seen. The Georgian justice system, which would be responsible, has been criticised as being captured by GD for years; and the recent refusal of the chair of the Georgian parliament to meet with a delegation of parliamentarians from EU Member States over the CEC investigation does not bode well.
If the EU itself has not openly questioned the legitimacy of the new Parliament, last week three European leaders called Georgia to not only investigate and address these irregularities, referring to the risk at which Georgia’s European trajectory is placed. French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk concluded that “unless Georgia reverses its current course of action and demonstrates tangible reform efforts, in particular by repealing recent legislation that runs counter to European values and principles, we will not be in a position to support the opening of accession negotiations with Georgia.”
To know more
Tsuladze, L., Abzianidze, N., Amashukeli, M., & Javakhishvili, L. (2023). De-Europeanization as discursive disengagement: has Georgia “got lost” on its way to European integration? Journal of European Integration, 46(3), 297–319
Dr Tsuladze’s interview on the RevDem Podcast: How Georgian Dream Has Diverted Away from Europe and Its Implications for the Upcoming Elections
Dr Tsuladze’ s post on the NYU Jordan Center blog: Tracing the Georgian Ruling Party’s De-Europeanization